Causes of the Second Punic War Essay

The instant unreliable war was the greatest and virtually dangerous ace capital of Italy was compelled to fight on their way to the conquering of the Mediterranean. With 17 long epoch of battle causing heavy casualties to be suffered on both sides, the Second perfidious War has proven to be an main(prenominal) term period in the Roman and Punic empires. For capital of Italy, the end of the war meant the defection of most Southern Italy (Kagan 232, 1995) and many economic problems. For Carthage this meant the end of their sharpen to power, and the realization that the idea of Mediterranean control being based in Africa quite than Europe was no longer a possibility (Kagan 233, 1995).both empires had a lot at stake upon entering the war, but as will be discussed, many historians believe that eventual contravention was inevitable. precedent(a) grievances and battles pitted the Romans and Carthaginians against one an new(prenominal) ultimately leading to the Second Pun ic War and the resulting downfall of Carthage. The ancient sources written by Livy, Polybius Dio Cassius and Appian place a great trade in of blame on Hannibal in starting the Second Punic War. Though some of the authors justify his actions to an extent, Hannibals invasion of Saguntum is pinpointed as the quick make out of the Second Punic War.Dio Cassius and Appian find little discernment in the motives behind Hannibals actions. As discussed by each of the writers, Hannibals father, after the loss of Sicily, harbored extreme hatred toward the Romans and instilled these feelings into Hannibal from a very childly age. All four authors mention an blasphemy taken by Hannibal at age nine in which he vowed revenge against the Romans for their unsporting actions. Livy writes that this jinx bound Hannibal to prove himself, as soon as he could, an competitor to the Roman people (Kagan 93-94, 1975).Sure enough, upon ascending to power, as if Italy had been decreed to him as his prov ince, and the war with capital of Italy committed to him, (Kagan 95, 1975) Hannibal marched toward Saguntum with the knowledge that this would get a machinate out of the Romans. Ultimately, Livy asserts that the blame is dependent on whether it was allowed to be done by the treaty (Kagan 103, 1975). Polybius outlines three clear causes of the Second Punic war. First, as opposite ancient authors, Polybius points to Hannibals oath and long prevailing grudge against the Romans.However, he continues to formulate the reasons for Hannibals rage, the First Punic War, which Polybius calls the most alpha cause of the later(prenominal) war (Kagan106, 1975). At the close of the mercenary war, Carthage did all it could to avoid conflict with capital of Italy, eventually costing them Sardinia and large indemnities that were to paid to the Romans both immediately and all over time. This unequal treaty on the part of the Romans is the leading incidentor in Carthages hatred toward Rome. Thir dly, Polybius credits the Carthaginian successes in Ibera as the ternary leading cause of the Second Punic war.Having secured a great deal of territory and further motivated by victories, Carthage felt that they were strong and tendinous enough to take on Rome. It is for this reason that Hannibal chose to attack Saguntum at this time to elicit a response from the great empire. Upon being confronted by the Romans, Hannibal does non concede the real infralying causes for his attack, but insists instead that it is retaliation for the Carthaginian leaders put to death by Roman arbitrators in Saguntum. Polybius makes an raise point that this failure to disclose his true motives may have caused more(prenominal) blame to fall on Hannibals shoulders.Polybius writes, he had non posit a word of the real cause, but alleged the fictitious one of the matter of Saguntum and so go the credit of first base the war (Kagan 107, 1975) This avowal is important to consider in analyzing the anc ient sources, as many turn out a pro-Roman bias. Polybius recognizes that the immediate action that brought the war was that of Hannibal, but also that we must acknowledge that the Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war. (Kagan 109, 1975).In his essay The miscue for Rome, plain-spoken argues that the nations came to blows because the Barcid family were able to keep alive the bitter feelings aroused by former defeats (Kagan 118, 1975). As with Polybius, coarse discusses the true nature of the attack versus the plea for battle Hannibal was stating. Throughout the exchange of embassies and the lead-up to the Roman and Carthaginian battles, Hannibal never wavered from his command that Carthage was seeking revenge for those officials who had been executed in Saguntum.Frank continues on to state his opinion that the war amid the two empires was not inevitable, but rather a matter of Hannibal and the Carthaginians wanting to restore their pride. In com paring Frank to opposite modern authors, he is much less sensitive to the wrongdoings on the part of Rome. Frank faults Hannibal for the beginning of the war, justifying the alliance with Saguntum and accusing Hannibal of starting a war based on illegitimate grudges. In his essay, Frank claims that an unwished war had been thrust (Kagan 119, 1975) upon Rome.In analyzing the other modern sources, it is evident that Franks view is the uncommon one and that Rome was in fact an instigator in the Second Punic war. While Hallward acknowledges the anger of Carthage as a factor in Hannibals actions, he is also quite hard on the Romans for their unjust actions following the First Punic War. In 237 B. C. , the Romans, with no shadow of salutary, had troopsd Carthage to surrender Sardinia and to pay an additional allowance of 1200 talents (Kagan 120, 1975).Hallward acknowledges that it was outside the moral and legal realm of Rome to seize Sardinia and force the payment of such steep indem nities. He continues to discuss the limitations imposed on Carthage with the Ebro treaty. As Rome grew more concerned with Carthages advancements in Spain, they took usefulness of the times to impose the treaty and restrict Carthage from advancing past the Ebro River. An important aspect of the Ebro treaty is the implications that came with it. This treaty implies that Rome would not foil Carthaginian expansion up to the River.Though dates are unclear, had the alliance with Saguntum already existed, it was an implied tariff on Rome not to use the town Saguntum as an creature to hinder Carthaginian expansion within the sphere recognized as open to her (Kagan 120, 1975). Rome failed to stay out of Carthages way and became a bother and a hindrance in their seek for expansion. In Saguntum, Rome intervened to bring into power, not without bloodshed, a party hostile to Carthage and to promote crash with the neighboring tribe of the Torboletae, who were subjects of the Carthaginians (Kagan 120, 1975).Not only was this alliance against unjust in that it was against the spirit of the treaty, but it was also scandalizeful on Romes part. In the eight months in which Saguntum and Carthage were battling, Rome was hesitant to send support. Saguntum was unserviceable and distant, and the material interests of Rome were protected in the Ebro treaty (Kagan 121, 1975). However, in spite of having so little to gain, Rome pursued an alliance with this nation to hinder Carthage and impose themselves in the Carthaginian realm.All of these actions on Romes part were harsh reminders of the unfair treatment Carthage had received since the First Punic war. Though past grudges contend a key role, Romes continued hostilities and instigatory actions gave good cause for the hateful feelings to continue, and ultimately led Carthage, under Hannibals command, to seizing Saguntum as a way of bringing away a response from Rome. Throughout his essay, Scullard asserts that Hannibal and Carthage were within their legal and moral right in seizing Saguntum.Scullard bases this conclusion on his analysis of the treaties that existed amongst Rome and Carthage at that time. He first addresses the treaty made with Lutatius in 241. He states that Carthage was within their rights because Romes alliance with Saguntum was later than the treaty of Lutatius, so that the town was not include in the list of Romes allies whom the Carthaginians had promised to respect (Kagan 123, 1975) In regards to the Treaty of Ebro, he points to the simple geographic fact that Saguntum was located 100 miles south of the Ebro River, well in the field of honor which Carthage had been promised.Also in regards to this treaty, Scullard mentions a similar point to Hallward in that Saguntum could not in equity be used by the Romans as a handle to check Punic expansion in the south (Kagan 124, 1975). Scullard also addresses Hannibals hatred of Rome which is discussed in so many other sources. Scullar d asserts that though there is evidence and cause for the hatred, Hamilcar roleplayd into Spain with the intention of re-establishing his bucolics lost empire, not seeking revenge.Based on the treaties which had been made, and the unjust actions of Rome, Scullard states Rome had no legal ground to restrain Hannibal from attacking Saguntum, he was within his legal rights and was no treaty breaker (Kagan 124, 1975). As with the other modern writers, Errington acknowledges the anger of Hannibal but does not point to these emotions as the cause for war. Instead, Errington recognizes the wrong doing of Rome in the events leading up to the Second Punic war.It is vital to understand that the peace of 241 and Romes subsequent annexation of Sardinia were presented as the bitter Barcid disappointment which precipitated another war 23 years later (Errington, 53). It is crucial to understand the reasoning behind Hannibals anger, rather than condemn him as a tempered, vengeful leader. Erringto n continues to write about the raging interference with Carthages friends in Saguntum. This arbitration and newfound friendship with Saguntum reminded Carthage too much of the convenient alliances Rome had made in the past with the Mamerties and the Sardinian mercenaries. Errington 55-56).In concluding, he addresses the Roman traditions regarding the Punic war, which firmly blamed Hannibal for the beginning of the war. He evaluates these claims as simplified and grotesquely wrong (Scullard, 60) asserting that the Romans played a part in inviting the war through their actions against Carthage. In Kagans chapter on the Second War, he gives an in depth acanthaground which allows the lector to fully grasp and understand the circumstances which led to the actions and emotions of both empires. The peacetime between the two wars was crucial in leading up to the second Punic war.During this time, Romans involved themselves in a war in Sardinia at the call for of the mercenaries. This i nvolvement against Carthage was a clear violation of the treaty of 241 and without any well(p) pretext (Kagan 253). The Romans knowingly and blatantly broke the treaty which had been formed between the two nations. Once involved, Rome took advantage of their situation and demanded Sardinia and massive indemnities from Carthage. The Carthaginians were laboured to reluctantly accept, but they resented that their treaty had been violated and that they taken advantage of.This resolution reflected the relationship of power between Rome and Carthage at a time when Carthage was unnaturally weak (Kagan 255). As the empire gained its power back through Spain, they became more confident in their abilities to match up against Rome, and Rome became more nervous regarding their ability to do so. Kagan discusses the alliance made between Saguntum and Rome and concludes that either way, Rome was in the wrong. Had the alliance occurred beforehand, it should have been included in the treaty, but had it been afterward, then it was a direct violation of the Ebro treaty. any way, Rome was in the wrong to try to prevent Carthage from taking Saguntum, a city of little importance or value to the Roman empire. Kagan, standardized other authors, addresses the Roman tradition of blaming Hannibals oath and anger. Kagan argues the rejection of the wrath and the oath leads to a diminution in the responsibility of Carthage. It is possible to see its appearance as entirely reactive and defensive (Kagan 270, 1995). In Hannibals quest to restore the empire which had been taken fro him, Carthage pushed through Spain in the territory they were permitted. In this view, Hannibals attack on Saguntum broke no treaty and was confirm by any fair understanding of the Ebro treaty (Kagan 270, 1995). Each of the authors offered a similar story, but the bias and blame was placed differently in each piece. The ancient writers seem to fall into the trap of the Roman traditions, faulting Hannibal heav y for the vengeance he felt toward Rome throughout his life. However, as we move to the more modern authors, it is apparent that Carthages actions were simply a importation and reply to those of Rome.Hannibal was within his rights of both treaties when he attacked Saguntum, and it was not the right of Rome to become involved. Carthage had been undermined by Rome on several occasions, and they were right to stand up against Rome in the eyes of further injustice. While the immediate blame for the Second Punic war may fall on Hannibal and his invasion of Saguntum based on Roman hatred, it is important to realize that the rudimentary causes of the war were in fact instigated by Rome and their policies in the preceding decades.